Abstention: The Unexpected Power of Withholding Your Vote by Hayden, Grant M.
University of Connecticut 
OpenCommons@UConn 
Connecticut Law Review School of Law 
2010 
Abstention: The Unexpected Power of Withholding Your Vote 
Grant M. Hayden 
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review 
Recommended Citation 
Hayden, Grant M., "Abstention: The Unexpected Power of Withholding Your Vote" (2010). Connecticut Law 
Review. 95. 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/95 
 585 
CONNECTICUT 
LAW REVIEW 
 
VOLUME 43 DECEMBER 2010 NUMBER 2 
 
Article 
  
Abstention: The Unexpected Power of        
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This Article examines the effect of abstentions on the outcome of votes.  
Scholars (and voters) operate under two basic assumptions about the 
nature of abstention.  First, they assume that an abstention affects all 
alternatives in equal measure.  Second, and relatedly, people assume that a 
voter’s preferred alternative will be less likely to win if that voter abstains 
(and, of course, more likely to win if she votes).  Removing the potential 
full support of a vote and replacing it with the fifty-fifty proposition of an 
abstention should hurt the chances of a voter’s preferred alternative.  
These two assumptions guide the thinking on abstentions at all levels of 
democratic decision-making, and have been incorporated into everything 
from voting procedures themselves to conflict of interest rules.   
The thesis of this Article is that these fundamental assumptions about 
abstention are often false.  Initially, there are many potential situations, 
which fall under a phenomenon known as the “No-Show Paradox,” where 
voters help their favored alternative by withholding their vote.  More 
importantly, there are many situations in which abstention does not 
express something like fifty-fifty indifference with respect to outcome.  
Instead, under many voting procedures in a wide range of democratic 
institutions, abstention places a thumb on the scale for (or against) one of 
the alternatives.  Together, these findings challenge our basic assumptions 
about abstention and undercut the justification for many of the voting 
procedures in our most significant democratic institutions, from Congress 
to courts and corporations to unions. 
 
 
 ARTICLE CONTENTS 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 587 
II.  BACKGROUND .................................................................................... 588 
A.  ABSTENTION DEFINED ........................................................................ 588 
B.  WHY DO PEOPLE ABSTAIN? ................................................................ 589 
III.  THE POWER OF ABSTENTION ........................................................ 596 
A.  THE NO-SHOW PARADOX ................................................................... 596 
B.  WHEN ABSTENTION FAILS TO EXPRESS INDIFFERENCE ...................... 603 
IV.  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 615 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Abstention: The Unexpected Power of        
Withholding Your Vote 
GRANT M. HAYDEN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Democratic institutions make their most significant decisions by voting 
on them.  The public elects representatives at the federal, state, and local 
level, who, in turn, use voting procedures to pass laws and ordinances.  
People participate more directly in the lawmaking process through votes on 
initiative, referendum, or recall votes.  Higher courts (and some lower 
ones) with multiple judges typically resolve their cases through votes.  
Stockholders elect corporate board members, who then vote on firm 
decisions.  Employees decide whether they want union representation by 
voting on it, and then do the same to elect union officers, approve 
contracts, and authorize strikes. Countless numbers of other 
organizations—from charities to universities to private clubs—employ 
voting procedures to make their most important decisions.   
Most of these democratic institutions, however, also allow people to 
abstain—to withhold their vote.  In some cases, people abstain when they 
are indifferent among the electoral choices, or when they judge the benefits 
of voting to be outweighed by the costs.  In other cases—when, for 
example, a potential voter has a conflict of interest—an institution may 
actually compel one of its members to abstain as a kind of “forced” 
indifference on the matter.  The underlying assumption in both of these 
cases is that abstention, unlike voting, is neutral with respect to the 
outcome.  But while the contours of the right to vote have been the subject 
of a tremendous amount of scholarship across many disciplines, abstention, 
despite its obvious connection to the right to vote, has been almost 
completely ignored.   
Instead, most scholars—and voters—make a couple of basic 
assumptions about the nature and effect of abstention.  First, they assume 
that an abstention affects all alternatives in equal measure.  If, for example, 
a legislature is voting on a proposition, it is widely thought that an 
abstention always has the effect of distributing the abstaining member’s 
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voting power fifty-fifty for and against passage.  This, of course, is 
consistent with the view that, all things being equal, abstentions are neutral 
with respect to outcome.  Second, and related, people assume that a voter’s 
preferred alternative will be less likely to win if that voter abstains and, of 
course, more likely to win if she votes.  Removing the potential full 
support of a vote and replacing it with the fifty-fifty proposition of an 
abstention should hurt the chances of a voter’s preferred alternative.  These 
two assumptions guide the thinking on abstentions at all levels of 
democratic decision-making, and have been incorporated into everything 
from the voting procedures themselves to conflict of interest rules. 
The thesis of this Article is that these fundamental assumptions about 
abstention are false.  The first part of the Article defines abstention and 
fleshes out some of the scholarly work on what motivates the decision to 
abstain in both large elections and smaller parliamentary bodies.  The 
second part of the Article makes use of rational choice and voting power 
theory to demonstrate that the basic assumptions about abstention are 
misguided.  Initially, there are many potential situations, which fall under 
what’s known as the “No-Show Paradox,” where voters help their favored 
alternative by withholding their vote.  More important, there are many 
situations in which abstention does not express something like fifty-fifty 
indifference with respect to outcome.  Instead, under many voting 
procedures in a wide range of democratic institutions, abstention places a 
thumb on the scale for (or against) one of the alternatives.  Together, these 
findings both challenge our basic assumptions about abstention and 
undercut the justification for many of the voting procedures in our most 
significant democratic institutions. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Abstention Defined 
Abstention is a term in election procedure for when an eligible voter 
refrains from voting.  It may occur in the context of a public vote designed 
to select among candidates for political office, or to pass judgment on an 
official proposition.  In such cases, abstention usually describes what 
occurs when a voter does not go to the polls on election day.1  Abstention 
                                                                                                                          
1 Abstentions in larger public elections may also include voters who show up at the polls and fail 
to cast a vote for one of the alternatives on the ballot.  This may occur when one casts an incomplete 
ballot, which most frequently occurs with elections for offices further down the ballot in a process 
called “roll-off.”  See Peter Brien, Voter Pamphlets: The Next Best Step in Election Reform, 28 J. 
LEGIS. 87, 107–10 (2002) (discussing possible causes of, and remedies for, voter roll-off); R. Darcy & 
Anne Schneider, Confusing Ballots, Roll-Off, and the Black Vote, 42 W. POL. Q. 347, 348 (1989) 
(“‘Roll-off’ measures the tendency of the electorate to vote for ‘prestige’ offices but not for lower 
offices on the same ballot and at the same election.”).  It may also occur as an act of protest.  See infra 
notes 29–33 and accompanying text.   
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may also occur in the context of a smaller decision-making body such as a 
legislature, court, board, or law school faculty.  In these cases, abstention is 
often a more affirmative act, describing what happens when a member 
shows up, and thus counts for the purposes of achieving a quorum, but then 
refuses to cast a ballot or, under some procedures, votes “present” or 
“abstention” (refusing to vote “yes” or “no”).2  Of course, abstention may 
also occur in legislatures when a member fails to show up, thus failing to 
count for purposes of a quorum as well.3  But whether the vote is a large 
public election or a small decision-making body, abstention simply 
describes the failure to vote for one of the alternatives. 
B.  Why Do People Abstain? 
So why, exactly, do eligible voters abstain?  Several of the primary 
theoretical tools for analyzing voting systems pay little attention to this 
question.  Social choice theory, as originally developed by Kenneth Arrow 
and Duncan Black and carried forward by legions of other scholars,4 gives 
little attention to the decision not to vote.5  Most of their theoretical work, 
while formally elegant and quite powerful, operates under the assumption 
that individual preference profiles, which may include both preference and 
indifference relations, are actually input into a social choice function to 
produce a social choice.6  In other words, they usually assume that people 
vote to express their preferences.  Similarly, voting power theorists, with a 
few recent exceptions,7 have spent very little of their energy on abstention, 
                                                                                                                          
2 President Barack Obama faced criticism during the presidential campaign for his “present” votes 
in the Illinois Senate.  See Raymond Hernandez & Christopher Drew, It’s Not Just ‘Ayes’ and ‘Nays’: 
Obama’s Votes in Illinois Echo, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, at A1. 
3 Indeed, the European Parliament eliminated its Friday sessions because too few members 
showed up.  See Abdul G. Noury, Abstention in Daylight: Strategic Calculus of Voting in the European 
Parliament, 121 PUB. CHOICE 179, 200 (2004). 
4 Some of the foundational works in modern social choice theory are KENNETH J. ARROW, 
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1966) and DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES 
AND ELECTIONS (1958).  For a recent summary of the state of social choice theory and Arrow’s 
theorem, see 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 2002).  
Social choice theory has come into the legal literature mainly in the guise of public choice theory.  See 
generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION (1991); PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (Maxwell L. 
Stearns ed., 1997). 
5 Gerald Garvey, The Theory of Party Equilibrium, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 29 (1966) 
(“[W]hile Duncan Black’s Theory of Committees and Elections and Kenneth Arrow’s Social Choice 
and Individual Values are characterized by a most impressive formal elegance, it is also true that 
neither makes provision for nonvoting.”). 
6 See generally ARROW, supra note 4; BLACK, supra note 4; see also NORMAN FROHLICH & JOE 
A. OPPENHEIMER, MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1978); PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND 
POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (1986); WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: 
A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 
(1982). 
7 See, e.g., DAN S. FELSENTHAL & MOSHÉ MACHOVER, THE MEASUREMENT OF VOTING POWER: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE, PROBLEMS AND PARADOXES 279–93 (1998); Matthew Braham & Frank 
Steffen, Voting Power in Games with Abstentions, in POWER AND FAIRNESS 333 (Manfred J. Holler et 
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choosing instead to focus on the measurement of voting power after the 
initial decision is made to cast a ballot.8 
Most of the work done in answering the question why voters abstain 
comes out of the theoretical framework of rational choice theory.  Anthony 
Downs, in his classic work, An Economic Theory of Democracy, set the 
stage by describing the individual decision to vote or abstain in terms of an 
expected utility calculation.9  For Downs, the basic formula looked like 
this: R = PB – C, where R is the expected utility from voting; P is the 
probability that an individual’s vote will be decisive; B is the benefit, the 
stream of utility that flows from the successful election of the chosen 
alternative or candidate; and C is the cost of voting.10  If R ends up 
positive, then the individual votes; if not, she abstains.11  Downs’s formula 
thus promised to give social scientists a useful tool to explain and predict 
voting behavior.   
This formula, though, immediately gave rise to an issue regarding 
voter turnout.  But it wasn’t the more familiar issue of explaining low (and 
falling) voter turnout, but its opposite—why people bother to vote at all.12  
In most applications of the formula, especially in large elections, the 
probability of casting the deciding vote is infinitesimally small.  This 
drives the value of PB down toward zero, and it is thus outweighed by 
even the slightest cost to voting.  The basic formula, then, predicts that 
most instrumentally rational people will rarely, if ever, take the time to 
vote.13  This is, of course, at odds with the fact that millions of people 
regularly show up at the polls.  Thus, the issue of voter turnout was that far 
too many people vote than can be explained by Downs’s formula.  This led 
                                                                                                                          
al. eds., 2002); Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, Models and Reality: The Curious Case of the 
Absent Abstention, in POWER INDICES AND COALITION FORMATION 87, 88–92 (Manfred J. Holler & 
Guillermo Owen eds., 2001); Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, Ternary Voting Games, 26 INT’L 
J. GAME THEORY 335, 335–36 (1997); Josep Freixas & William S. Zwicker, Weighted Voting, 
Abstention, and Multiple Levels of Approval, 21 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 399, 400–01 (2003); Ines 
Lindner, A Special Case of Penrose’s Limit Theorem When Abstention Is Allowed, 64 THEORY & 
DECISION 495, 496–97 (2008).  
8 A few years ago, Moshé Machover noted that a study of abstentions was “a very young and as 
yet under-developed part of the theory of voting power.”  Moshé Machover, Comment on Matthew 
Braham and Frank Steffen, Voting Power in Games with Abstentions, in POWER AND FAIRNESS, supra 
note 7, at 349, 349. 
9 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 36 (1957).  
10 Id. at 36–50, 260–76; William H. Riker & Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of 
Voting, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 25, 25–26 (1968). 
11 DOWNS, supra note 9, at 265–76; Riker & Ordeshook, supra note 10, at 25.  Downs takes 
account of party preferences as well, but the basic calculation is the same.  DOWNS, supra note 9, at 
265–76. 
12 See John A. Ferejohn & Morris P. Fiorina, The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic 
Analysis, 68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525, 525 (1974); Riker & Ordeshook, supra note 10, at 26.  Downs 
himself left this mystery to others to figure out.  DOWNS, supra note 9, at 260–76.  Others, like Gordon 
Tullock, popularized the idea that voting was irrational.  GORDON TULLOCK, TOWARD A 
MATHEMATICS OF POLITICS 108–10 (1967).   
13 TULLOCK, supra note 12, at 110. 
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to much consternation in the rational choice field, eventually leading 
Bernard Grofman to pose the question whether turnout was the “paradox 
that ate rational choice theory.”14   
The fact that people vote in large numbers either meant that many 
people were acting irrationally or that there was something wrong with the 
formula.  Suspecting the latter, William Riker and Peter Ordeshook 
reworked the formula into its present form by adding a term, D, intended to 
capture the benefits to voting unrelated to being decisive to the outcome.15  
The calculation now looks like this: R = PB – C + D.16  The 
noninstrumental benefits of voting captured by the D term include such 
things as “the satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting, . . . 
affirming allegiance to the political system, . . . affirming a partisan 
preference . . .”17 and other benefits sometimes described as fulfilling a 
“sense of citizen duty”18 (or, less formally, as getting “a big bang out of 
pulling the lever”).19  With the addition of the D term, most of the focus on 
voting behavior has shifted away from the negligible PB term to the C and 
D terms—the noninstrumental parts of the equation that appear to drive 
most decisions to vote or abstain.        
This basic rational choice theory formulation gets applied in two 
bodies of empirical literature that answer the question why people vote—
one for large public elections, and one for smaller legislative bodies.  The 
scholarship on people’s decisions to vote (or not) in public elections is 
quite extensive, encompassing studies that examine the causes of voter 
turnout in large numbers of elections.20  The decision to vote in legislative 
bodies, on the other hand, has not attracted the same degree of scholarly 
attention: while there are many studies of legislative voting, the 
overwhelming majority of them limit their examination to yes and no 
votes, and put abstentions to the side.21  Indeed, there are only a handful of 
                                                                                                                          
14 His answer was “no.”  See generally Bernard Grofman, Is Turnout the Paradox That Ate 
Rational Choice Theory, in INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION, AND CHOICE: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN PERSPECTIVE 93, 93–103 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1993). 
15 Riker & Ordeshook, supra note 10, at 25–28.  
16 Id. at 28.  
17 Id. 
18 Ferejohn & Fiorina, supra note 12, at 525.  Downs briefly discussed such noninstrumental 
factors but strictly limited his model to political and economic ends.  DOWNS, supra note 9, at 274–76.  
19 Ferejohn & Fiorina, supra note 12, at 526.  
20 See, e.g., RICHARD G. NIEMI & HERBERT F. WEISBERG, CONTROVERSIES IN VOTING BEHAVIOR 
22 (2001); FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON’T VOTE 16–21 
(1988); RUY A. TEIXEIRA, THE DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER 1–4, 11–13 (1992) [hereinafter 
TEIXEIRA, DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER]; RUY A. TEIXEIRA, WHY AMERICANS DON’T VOTE: 
TURNOUT DECLINE IN THE UNITED STATES 1960–1984, at 27–34 (1987) [hereinafter TEIXEIRA, 
TURNOUT DECLINE]; William Crotty, Political Participation: Mapping the Terrain, in POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1, 1–21 (William Crotty ed., 1991) (analyzing the 
reasons for the low number of Americans citizens who vote);  Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2135–38 (1996).  
21 Noury, supra note 3, at 180. 
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studies of legislative abstention,22 which, as we shall see, is especially odd 
given the more significant role that it plays in outcomes.  In any case, the 
studies of both large and small scale election procedures confirm the 
impression that abstention is viewed as something that expresses 
indifference with respect to outcomes. 
1.  Abstention in Large Public Elections 
For large electorates, abstention is often viewed as an expression of 
indifference.  Downs, with his focus on the instrumental aspect voting (the 
P and the B in the rational choice theory equation), explains indifference as 
driving the B term down to zero because an indifferent voter, by definition, 
receives no benefit from the election of any particular candidate.23  Such 
indifference, he notes, could reflect either equal satisfaction or equal 
disgust with the alternatives.24  If voting were costless, only those who 
were perfectly indifferent would abstain, for all others would at least 
generate some expected utility (captured by the PB term), no matter how 
low the probability of casting the critical vote.25  If, as is the case, voting 
had real costs, then others would also abstain, depending, in part, upon a 
range of factors that included the individual costs (C), the probability of 
being critical (P), and their relative level of preference for the candidates 
(the B term, which would have a value greater than zero).26  Something 
short of perfect indifference would, therefore, still play a role in driving up 
abstentions, as voters with only slight preferences for one candidate over 
another would be less likely to vote than voters with more substantial 
preferences.  One of the causes of abstention, then, is voter indifference. 
What Downs terms “equal disgust” with the electoral alternatives looks 
like it captures one of the second major causes of abstention: voter 
alienation.27  Alienated voters, however, abstain not because they are 
indifferent, but because the slated candidates are too far away from their 
                                                                                                                          
22 See id. (listing studies dedicated to this subject). For other works studying abstention, see 
generally KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF 
ROLL CALL VOTING 210–26 (1997) (providing a broad historical study of congressional abstention); 
Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, How to Vote, Whether to Vote: Strategies for Voting and Abstaining 
on Congressional Roll Calls, 13 POL. BEHAV. 97 (1991) (detailing a study of congressional abstention 
with regard to a series of votes on a bill regarding the Clinch River Breeder Reactor);  Lawrence S. 
Rothenberg & Mitchell S. Sanders, Legislator Turnout and the Calculus of Voting: The Determinants 
of Abstention in the U.S. Congress, 103 PUB. CHOICE 259, 260 (2000) (describing a study of 
congressional abstention of votes in the House of Representatives of the 104th Congress).  
23 DOWNS, supra note 9, at 262–63. 
24 Id. at 263.  Downs, however, settles on the view that indifferent voters are basically satisfied 
with the choices because the political system would produce candidates that basically satisfied its 
voters.  Id. 
25 Id. at 261–63. 
26 Id. at 265–71. 
27 Id. at 262. 
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ideal point.28  For an alienated voter, there may be instrumental benefit to 
the election of a particular candidate, and thus such a voter is not 
necessarily indifferent.  But this benefit is outweighed in the equation by 
the value of protesting against a political system that offers such lousy 
choices.  This value may be alternatively described as a noninstrumental 
benefit of abstaining (the satisfaction of registering your dissatisfaction) or 
a cost of voting (losing out on that benefit).  Either way, this is captured in 
the C and D terms of the equation, and indicates a net noninstrumental loss 
to casting a vote. 
Alienated voters may abstain in different ways.  In many cases, they 
may simply fail to show up at the polls on election day.  In countries with 
compulsory voting, such a failure is obviously a more potent method of 
registering dissatisfaction, and hence such protest abstention has been 
observed and studied in places such as Brazil29 and the former USSR.30  
Alienated voters may also make their intentions clear by actually showing 
up at the polls and casting a protest vote.  In some jurisdictions, even in the 
United States, the official ballot contains a “None of the Above” option.31  
In other places, voters may intentionally nullify their ballots by writing in 
the same sentiment, writing in the name of a cartoon character, or drawing 
an X through the ballot.32  The protest may be that of a single individual or 
of a more organized campaign, as in the recent “Voto Nulo” campaign in 
Mexico’s recent midterm elections.33  In any case, abstention is a way to 
express dissatisfaction with the slated candidates or, in some cases, the 
entire political system. 
Of course, people may abstain for all sorts of other reasons in large 
elections.  Indeed, it’s somewhat of a cottage industry among political 
scientists and other academics to catalogue the many determinants of 
turnout.34  As mentioned above, most of those reasons have to do with the 
                                                                                                                          
28 Paul W. Thurner & Angelika Eymann, Policy-Specific Alienation and Indifference in the 
Calculus of Voting: A Simultaneous Model of Party Choice and Abstention, 102 PUB. CHOICE 51, 53 
(2000). 
29 See generally Timothy J. Power & J. Timmons Roberts, Compulsory Voting, Invalid Ballots, 
and Abstention in Brazil, 48 POL. RES. Q. 795 (1995). 
30 See generally Rasma Karklins, Soviet Elections Revisited: Voter Abstention in Noncompetitive 
Voting, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 449 (1986). 
31 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.269 (2008) (requiring every ballot for statewide office or for 
United States President or Vice President to include an option to vote for “[n]one of these candidates”).   
32 The exact effect of such votes depends upon the election procedures in place.  See, e.g., HENRY 
M. ROBERT ET AL., ROBERT’S RULES OF ORDER 401–03 (10th ed., 2000) [hereinafter ROBERT’S RULES] 
(explaining that such illegal ballots usually count for the purposes of the quorum but not as either a 
“yea” or “nay” vote). 
33 See, e.g., Marc Lacey, Disgruntled Mexicans Plan an Election Message to Politicians: We 
Prefer Nobody, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2009, at A8 (detailing the “Voto Nulo” campaign in Mexico’s 
midterm elections).   
34 See, e.g., NIEMI & WEISBERG, supra note 20, at 22; PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 20, at 16–
21; TEIXEIRA, DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER, supra note 20, at 1–5, 10–13; TEIXEIRA, TURNOUT 
DECLINE, supra note 20, at 27–34; Crotty, supra note 20, at 1–21; Hasen, supra note 20, at 2135–38.  
 594 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:585 
relative noninstrumental costs and benefits to voting (the C and D terms).  
The costs of voting, for example, may be driven up by illness, bad weather, 
or difficult registration requirements.  The sense of citizen duty may wax 
and wane with the perceived importance of an election.  The list of reasons 
why an individual voter may decide to vote or abstain is, indeed, quite 
long. 
That said, none of the theories of voter abstention holds that a decision 
to abstain expresses anything other than indifference among the ballot 
alternatives.  In some cases, when indifference is said to drive the decision, 
this is quite obvious.  But even when abstention is a product of voter 
alienation or some other mix of noninstrumental costs and benefits, there is 
no claim that the abstention is intended to have any effect on the passage of 
a proposition or the election of a particular candidate.  Abstention in large, 
public elections is thought to be neutral with respect to the outcome. 
2.  Abstention in Small Legislative Bodies 
Abstention gets more interesting in smaller legislative bodies.  In part, 
this is so because as the size of the electorate goes down, the probability of 
casting the decisive vote goes up.  The P factor, which drove the 
instrumental benefit of voting down to near zero in large elections (and 
caused so much angst among rational choice theorists), plays a more 
significant role in small group decision-making.35  Abstention is also more 
interesting in small groups because the decision to abstain is driven by a 
new set of noninstrumental reasons.   
The chance to cast the critical vote in a smaller body is mainly a 
mathematical proposition.  Regardless of how one calculates the 
probability—and there are many different methods—the chance of casting 
a swing vote generally goes up as the size of the electorate goes down.  
Voters in smaller decision-making bodies may also be in a better position 
to assess ahead of time whether a given vote will be close.  These two 
aspects of smaller bodies have produced the testable hypotheses that there 
will be fewer abstentions as both: (1) the electorate becomes smaller; and 
(2) the decision is anticipated to be closer.36  Both factors should drive up 
P, the probability of being decisive, and, all other things being equal, 
should drive down the number of abstentions as voters have a greater 
chance of casting the critical vote.  And while there have been a limited 
number of studies of legislative abstention, there is some evidence to 
support these hypotheses.37  
                                                                                                                          
35 See Noury, supra note 3, at 184; Rothenberg & Sanders, supra note 22, at 260. 
36 See Noury, supra note 3, at 183–84. 
37 See id. at 182–85 (using studies of voting behavior among members of the European Parliament 
to demonstrate that more members will vote when roll calls are closer and “abstention increases with 
the size of Parliament”).  Noury also cites similar studies examining the voting patterns of Congress, 
again finding that closeness plays a role.  Id. at 186.  
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More importantly, there are a few additional noninstrumental reasons 
that drive legislative abstentions.  Many bodies have conflict-of-interest 
rules, written or unwritten, which require their members to abstain any 
time they have a direct interest in the outcome of the vote not shared by 
other members of the body.  The U.S. House of Representatives, for 
example, requires its members to vote on legislation unless they have “a 
direct personal or pecuniary interest in the event of such question.”38  The 
U.S. Senate39 and all state legislatures40 have similar rules, as do all entities 
that have adopted manuals of parliamentary procedure such as Robert’s 
Rules of Order.41  Such voters are anything but indifferent, but 
indifference, in the form of an abstention, is forced upon them to avoid 
impropriety.   
In other cases, legislators may abstain because they are reluctant to be 
identified with a particular position.42  Sometimes they just do so by not 
casting a vote at all, but some legislative bodies—including the U.S. House 
of Representatives43 and some state legislatures44—offer an option of 
voting “present.”  (Indeed, Barack Obama was criticized during the 
presidential campaign for casting nearly 130 “present” votes while a 
member of the Illinois Senate.)45  Here, the indifference is feigned in order 
to cater to some other long-term interest.  Although the causes of “forced” 
and “feigned” indifference are quite dissimilar, the effect is the same—the 
voter abstains, and that abstention is thought to have no effect on the vote.  
Indeed, the use of abstention in such cases tells us quite directly that an 
abstention is thought to be absolutely neutral with respect to the outcome. 
Of course, voters in smaller bodies may have the more run-of-the-mill 
reasons for abstaining that this Article has already discussed.  They may 
actually be indifferent.  They may be protesting some aspect of the 
decision-making procedure.  Or there may be all sorts of other 
noninstrumental costs and benefits associated with casting a vote.  Indeed, 
one such “cost” was on display in a study of abstention in the European 
Parliament, where the authors of the study were forced to make “Friday” 
into a dummy variable because so many members skipped town for the 
                                                                                                                          
38 RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 111TH CONG., RULE III, cl. 1 (2009) [hereinafter 
HOUSE RULES].   
39 RULES OF THE SENATE, 111TH CONG., RULE XXXVII, cl. 4 (2009).  
40 Voting Recusal Provisions, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 2009) 
http://www.ncsl.org/?TabId=15357. 
41 See ROBERT’S RULES, supra note 32, at 394 (“No member should vote on a question in which 
he has a direct personal or pecuniary interest not common to other members of the organization.”). 
42 See MORRIS P. FIORINA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND CONSTITUENCIES 69−70 
(1974); Freixas & Zwicker, supra note 7, at 401 n.1. 
43 HOUSE RULES, RULE XX, cl. 2(a), 4(a). 
44 See, e.g., RULES OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 96th Gen. Assemb., art. I, Senate 
Rule 1-9 (2009).  
45 Hernandez & Drew, supra note 2, at A1. 
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weekend and missed the votes.46  (The European Parliament subsequently 
eliminated Friday sessions for that very reason.)47  Whatever the causes, 
however, abstention in smaller decision-making bodies, as with larger 
ones, is expected to have a neutral effect on the outcome. 
*** 
While the scholarly commentary on abstention is limited, it is fairly 
consistent.  People abstain for a variety of reasons.  In larger elections, 
those reasons tend to have more to do with the noninstrumental costs and 
benefits of voting than with the potential effect of a vote on the outcome.  
This is less true in smaller legislative settings, where different kinds of 
noninstrumental motivations come into play and the chance that a vote 
could actually change the outcome becomes more significant.  In both 
cases, though, the expectation is that abstention is an expression of 
indifference.  As such, abstention is viewed as being neutral among 
alternatives and as an act that, compared with voting, reduces the chances 
of success for a favored alternative.  As we shall see in the next part of this 
Article, these assumptions are often wrong. 
III.  THE POWER OF ABSTENTION 
Widespread beliefs about abstention are misguided in two respects.  
First, there are circumstances in which eligible voters are more likely to 
achieve their desired outcomes by abstaining rather than by voting their 
true preferences.  Second, under many voting procedures, an abstention has 
the effect of casting a weighted vote—with the weight ranging from 
slightly more than half of a vote to a full vote—in favor of or against a 
particular alternative.  Taken together, these two features of abstention 
undercut scholarly theories and widespread voter beliefs regarding the 
neutral effect of abstention. 
A.  The No-Show Paradox 
Abstention has a surprising effect on outcomes in a phenomenon called 
the “No-Show Paradox.”  Peter Fishburn and Steven Brams first described 
the paradox in an article in Mathematics Magazine.48  There, they tell the 
tale of a couple whose car breaks down on the way to the polls, preventing 
them from casting their ballot for their favorite candidate in a three-way 
race.49  Their favorite candidate is eliminated in the first stage of a plurality 
                                                                                                                          
46 See Noury, supra note 3, at 192.  
47 See id. at 200. 
48 See generally Peter C. Fishburn & Steven J. Brams, Paradoxes of Preferential Voting: What 
Can Go Wrong with Sophisticated Voting Systems Designed To Remedy Problems of Simpler Systems, 
56 MATHEMATICS MAG. 207 (1983). 
49 Id. at 208. 
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runoff procedure, but their second-favorite candidate ends up winning the 
election.50  After the election, the couple discovers that, had they voted, 
their favorite candidate would have made it to the runoff, but would have 
then lost to their least-favorite candidate.51  The couple, in other words, 
achieved a better result by not voting than they would have by voting their 
true preferences.  This is an instance of what Fishburn and Brams termed 
the No-Show Paradox.52  
1.  The No-Show Paradox Defined  
The No-Show Paradox occurs when a voter is better off (in terms of 
achieving a desired outcome) by not voting rather than voting according to 
her preferences.53  The most straightforward example of this is known as 
the strong No-Show Paradox.54  The amendment procedure, commonly 
used in legislative and parliamentary voting, is vulnerable.  Take, for 
example, the following profile involving the preferences of nine voters 
over alternatives A, B, and C, with the most desired alternative on top55: 
 
2 voters 3 voters 2 voters 2 voters 
A 
B 
C 
B 
C 
A 
C 
A 
B 
C 
B 
A 
 
If the agenda of pairwise votes in the amendment procedure is A vs. B, 
winner to face C, then the winner if everyone votes is B (since B beats A 
5–4 in the first round, and B beats C 5–4 in the second round).  But 
suppose the two voters on the right decide to abstain.  In that case, C, their 
first-ranked alternative, would be the winner (since A beats B 4–3, then C 
beats A 5–2).  So if the members of that group vote their true preferences, 
their first-ranked alternative loses, but if they abstain, their first-ranked 
alternative wins.  Abstaining in such a situation certainly wouldn’t express 
indifference; in fact, it would be an effortless way to ensure the election of 
your favorite alternative!  
Perhaps we should have seen this coming from social choice theory.  
Although social choice theorists have spent little time examining 
abstentions, they have long known that when certain types of preference 
profiles are fed into certain decision procedures, there is the possibility for 
                                                                                                                          
50 Id. at 208–09. 
51 Id. at 209. 
52 Id. at 207. 
53 See HANNU NURMI, VOTING PARADOXES AND HOW TO DEAL WITH THEM 49 (1999).   
54 Hannu Nurmi, Monotonicity and Its Cognates in the Theory of Choice, 121 PUB. CHOICE 25, 
33–34 (2004). 
55 Id. at 33 tbl.9. 
 598 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:585 
paradoxes and manipulation.  Indeed, the most famous corollary of 
Arrow’s theorem—the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem—holds that all 
nondictatorial voting systems are vulnerable to strategic manipulation.56  If 
one can achieve a desired outcome by voting against one’s true 
preferences, it should not be that surprising that one could achieve a 
similar result by not voting at all.  But, unlike strategic voting, strategic 
abstention has not been the topic of much discussion. 
As these examples show, the paradox can occur when certain voting 
procedures are applied to certain preference profiles.  Abstaining in these 
circumstances does not merely rob your preferred candidate of additional 
support.  Nor does it help (or hurt) all candidates equally.  Instead, 
abstaining actually helps your preferred candidate.  The question then 
becomes whether these examples are artificial constructs of bored social 
choice theorists or accurate representations of actual voters using common 
decision-making procedures.  The following three examples give some 
sense of the range and power of the paradox. 
2.  Examples 
a.  Large Electorate Using a Plurality Runoff Procedure 
The plurality runoff procedure, used in many jurisdictions, is a 
sequential voting scheme used to ensure majority support of a single 
alternative.57  After the first round of voting, if any alternative receives 
majority support, then it is declared the winner.  If none of the alternatives 
receives majority support, then the two alternatives receiving the most 
votes are placed in a runoff to choose the winner.58  This common voting 
method can cause some perverse results in situations like the following59:    
 
47% of voters 2% of voters 26% of voters 25% of voters 
A 
B 
C 
A 
B 
C 
C 
A 
B 
B 
C 
A 
                                                                                                                          
56 Allan Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, 41 ECONOMETRICA 587, 
587 (1973); Mark Allen Satterthwaite, Strategy-Proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and 
Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions, 10 J. ECON.  THEORY 
187, 188 (1975). 
57 RIKER, supra note 6, at 74–76, 85–88; Jeffrey C. O’Neill, Everything That Can Be Counted 
Does Not Necessarily Count: The Right To Vote and the Choice of a Voting System, 2006 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 327, 333. 
58 There are actually at least two versions of plurality runoff procedures.  This example uses top- 
two runoff voting, which is one of the most common election methods.  O’Neill, supra note 57, at 333.  
Another variation is an elimination runoff election, where the alternatives with the lowest totals are 
eliminated in successive rounds until there is a majority support for one alternative.  Id. at 334.  In this 
example, with just three alternatives, this distinction does not matter. 
59 This example is from Nurmi, supra note 54, at 31 tbl.7. 
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If everyone votes, then in the first round, A (49%) and C (26%) make 
it to the runoff, while B (25%) is eliminated.  In the runoff, C (51%) beats 
A (49%).  Thus, if everyone votes, the winner is C.  If, on the other hand, 
the group of voters on the left abstains, we get a different result.  A is 
deprived of most of its votes in the first round necessitating a runoff 
between B (25%) and C (26%) (neither constitutes a majority of the 
remaining 53% of the voters).  In the runoff, B (27%) beats C (26%).  
Thus, if the group on the left votes, the winner is C, its least-preferred 
alternative; if that group abstains, then the winner is B, which, while not 
the group’s favorite, is still strictly preferred to C.  In this case, therefore, 
the voters on the left are better off abstaining than voting their true 
preferences. 
This instantiation of the No-Show Paradox is important for several 
reasons.  First, it shows that the paradox may occur using a voting 
procedure commonly used in large elections.  The runoff is, after the 
plurality method, the second-most common single-winner election method 
in the United States.60  Most southern states use runoff elections to fill their 
federal and state offices, and many local jurisdictions across the rest of the 
country do so as well.61  In addition, many countries use runoff procedures 
to elect their presidents, members of their national legislature, or both.62  
Second, this example is important because it shows that there may be 
situations where a substantial portion of the electorate (47%!) would be 
better off staying at home on election day.  Thus, a common election 
procedure may give rise to a highly counterintuitive result. 
b.  Small Electorate Using Amendment and Successive 
Procedures 
The amendment procedure is a sequential voting procedure used by 
many parliaments and legislatures.63  Various alternatives to the status quo, 
in the form of bills and amendments thereto, are considered according to 
an agenda.  The amendment procedure gives us unexpected results in an 
example with the following preference profile over alternatives A, B, C, 
and the status quo, represented by D:64 
                                                                                                                          
60 See O’Neill, supra note 57, at 333. 
61 CHARLES S. BULLOCK III & LOCH K. JOHNSON, RUNOFF ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 2, 
3 tbl.1.1 (1992).  
62 See INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN: 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL IDEA HANDBOOK 27–33 (2005). 
63 For a full description of the procedure, see RIKER, supra note 6, at 69–73; Saul Levmore, 
Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971, 1012 
(1989) (noting the ubiquity of the amendment procedure and its vulnerability to voting paradoxes); 
Grant M. Hayden, Note, Some Implications of Arrow’s Theorem for Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
295, 301–02 (1995). 
64 This example is from Nurmi, supra note 54, at 32. 
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10 voters 10 voters 10 voters 
A 
B 
D 
C 
B 
D 
C 
A 
D 
C 
A 
B 
 
Suppose the agenda is the following: (1) B vs. D; (2) winner to face A; 
(3) winner to face C.  If everyone votes, C wins, since B beats D 20–10, A 
beats B 20–10, and C beats A 20–10.  Yet the status quo, D, is preferred by 
every voter to C.  Had every voter abstained, they would have all been 
better off. 
This instantiation of the paradox involves a commonly used legislative 
voting procedure.  Virtually all legislative bodies use some version of the 
amendment procedure to pass laws, and smaller electoral bodies, following 
standard parliamentary procedure, are also vulnerable.65  This version of 
the paradox also involves a quite dramatic situation where, if everyone 
abstains, everyone benefits.       
c.  Large or Small Electorate with a Quorum Requirement 
Both of the preceding examples involved successive voting procedures 
involving more than two alternatives.  But a version of the paradox may 
present itself in certain situations where a single majority vote among two 
alternatives is coupled with a turnout condition.66  Many legislative bodies 
and committees often have quorum requirements, which ensure that a 
certain percentage of members must be present in order to conduct 
business.  In some cases, including both the U.S. House of Representatives 
and the U.S. Senate, the quorum is set at a simple majority of the eligible 
voting members.67  Many countries conduct referenda with participation or 
approval quorums—turnout requirements that function, for our purposes, 
the same way.68  Italy, for example, has a participation quorum such that 
changing the status quo requires that a majority of the voters support the 
proposition and that a majority of registered voters take part in the vote.69  
                                                                                                                          
65 See RIKER, supra note 6, at 69–71; ROBERT’S RULES, supra note 32, at 125. 
66 See Paulo P. Côrte-Real & Paulo T. Pereira, The Voter Who Wasn’t There: Referenda, 
Representation and Abstention, 22 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 349, 351 (2004); Luís Aguiar-Conraria & 
Pedro C. Magalhães, Referendum Design, Quorum Rules and Turnout 2 (Am. Political Sci. Ass’n, 2009 
Toronto Meeting Paper, Sept. 5, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1451131). 
67 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
68 See Côrte-Real & Pereira, supra note 66, 354 tbl.1; Aguiar-Conraria & Magalhães, supra note 
66, at 2. 
69 See Côrte-Real & Pereira, supra note 66, at 354–55, 354 tbl.1; Aguiar-Conraria & Magalhães, 
supra note 66, at 2. 
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When used on either a small or large scale, such requirements are intended 
to ensure that outcomes are representative of the entire electorate.  But they 
give rise to a version of the No-Show Paradox. 
In the presence of such quorum requirements, it is fairly easy to 
conjure up situations where voters are better off abstaining than showing 
up and casting a vote for their preferred alternative.  If a voter is against the 
proposition, she gets what she wants if either the quorum requirement is 
met and a majority of “no” votes exists or the quorum requirement is not 
met.  Thus, she faces a dilemma.  She can show up and vote no, in which 
case she registers her preference but contributes toward the quorum 
requirement, or she can abstain, in which case she doesn’t contribute 
toward the turnout requirement but fails to register her preference.  In cases 
where she calculates that she is more likely to defeat the proposal with the 
latter strategy than the former, she abstains.  Thus, this is another instance 
where a voter may be better off abstaining. 
This version of the paradox is significant for several reasons.  First, 
unlike the earlier examples, it may occur in a non-sequential voting 
procedure applied to just two alternatives.  Second, there is good evidence 
that this version of the paradox has occurred and has been acted upon (or, 
more aptly, not acted upon).  In 2003, Texas Democrats in the state house 
and state senate fled to Oklahoma and New Mexico, respectively, in order 
to defeat quorum requirements in an attempt to prevent passage of a 
redistricting bill that would have favored Republicans.70  On a larger scale, 
Italian voters were presented with a referendum in 2005 that would have 
liberalized the regulation of in vitro fertilization.71  The Catholic Church 
opposed the measure, and Pope Benedict XVI gave a speech just four days 
before the vote asking, “What is the principle of wisdom, if not to abstain 
from all that is odious to God?”72  Italian voters took the hint: even though 
ninety percent of people who actually voted supported the changes, turnout 
was well below the required majority participation quorum, leading to 
defeat of the measure.73  While these examples undercut the claim that this 
version of the No-Show Paradox sneaks up on more sophisticated political 
actors—indeed, quorum-busting is a well-known legislative technique—it 
does help reinforce just how many democratic decision-making procedures 
are vulnerable to it.  
3.  Implications 
Voters assume that their preferred alternatives will be less likely to win 
if they abstained than if they voted.  As can be seen in the foregoing 
                                                                                                                          
70 Democrats on the Run, Again, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2003, at A18. 
71 Aguiar-Conraria & Magalhães, supra note 66, at 2. 
72 Id.  
73 See id. 
 602 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:585 
examples, this assumption is clearly wrong under certain conditions.  The 
question then becomes how often these conditions are present in 
democratic voting regimes.  To answer this, we first need to know how 
often we actually use voting procedures that are vulnerable to the paradox 
and, second, how often we are faced with preference profiles that give rise 
to it. 
As demonstrated above, many popular voting procedures are 
vulnerable to the paradox.  Further, Hervé Moulin showed that every 
voting procedure that picks the Condorcet winner, when one exists, is 
vulnerable to the paradox.74  Other common methods that are not 
Condorcet extensions, such as the plurality runoff and instant runoff 
voting, are also at risk.75  Moreover, parliamentary and electoral 
procedures that make use of quorum or turnout requirements are also 
susceptible to a version of this problem, even in cases where there are only 
two alternatives being considered.  Thus, many common voting procedures 
are susceptible to the No-Show Paradox. 
It’s not as clear, though, that the types of preference profiles that give 
rise to the No-Show Paradox occur very often.  Aside from the quorum-
busting example, most versions of the paradox trade on the occurrence of a 
voting cycle.  A voting cycle occurs when the social preference order is 
intransitive, such as when A beats B, B beats C, and C beats A.  While 
social choice theorists originally believed that a large percentage of 
preference profiles gave rise to such cycles, more recent empirical work 
across a range of voting mechanisms have failed to discover them.76  The 
gap is most probably explained by the fact that early predictions were 
based on an impartial culture assumption—that all permutations of 
individual preference orders were equally likely to occur in a preference 
profile.77  With such an assumption, for example, almost one-third of the 
preference profiles that occur within a large electorate over six alternatives 
produce a voting cycle.78  In the absence of the assumption, though, the 
predicted rate of cycles may decline.   
This is especially true if the voting population has something loosely 
                                                                                                                          
74 See Hervé Moulin, Condorcet’s Principle Implies the No Show Paradox, 45 J. ECON. THEORY 
53, 55 (1988).  The Condorcet winner is the option that would beat each of the other options in a series 
of simple pairwise contests.  For background on the Condorcet voting procedures, see RIKER, supra 
note 6, at 67–69. 
75 The examples above demonstrate this to be true of plurality runoff procedures; instant runoff 
voting procedures, for obvious reasons, are similarly vulnerable.  
76 See Scott L. Feld & Bernard Grofman, Partial Single-Peakedness: An Extension and 
Clarification, 51 PUB. CHOICE 71, 71 (1986); Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civic Republicanism, 
and American Politics: Perspectives of a “Reasonable Choice” Modeler, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1541, 1553 
(1993).   
77 See Richard G. Niemi & Herbert F. Weisberg, A Mathematical Solution for the Probability of 
the Paradox of Voting, 13 BEHAV. SCI. 317, 321 (1968). 
78 See id. at 322 tbl.2.  
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referred to as “spectrum agreement.”79  Spectrum agreement occurs when 
individual voters array their preferences along a common spectrum—
political candidates, for example, may be placed on a common liberal to 
conservative spectrum.80  Such agreement may come in a variety of forms: 
it exists, for example, when voter preferences are “single-peaked” or, more 
broadly, “value restricted.”81  The important thing about these various 
forms of spectrum agreement is that they are a sufficient condition of 
transitive outcomes.82  While the required complete spectrum agreement is 
probably rare among large electorates, recent work in social choice theory 
demonstrates that much lesser degrees of social homogeneity will usually 
be enough to eliminate the possibility of a voting cycle.83  And we have a 
range of political, economic, sociological, and psychological reasons to 
believe that members of most electorates will exhibit a large degree of 
spectrum agreement.84  Thus, without the requisite preference profile, 
voting cycles—along with many versions of the No-Show Paradox—are 
less likely to occur. 
That said, the No-Show Paradox is a real feature of democratic 
decision-making.  The quorum-busting version of it shows up often enough 
to invalidate the assumption that voting for a preferred candidate is always 
better than not voting.  The widespread use of voting procedures that are 
vulnerable to the paradox also demonstrates the potential for 
counterintuitive results, though the number of actual incidences of the 
paradox may be limited by the small number of social preference profiles 
that give rise to voting cycles.  Thus, the No-Show Paradox is a strongly 
counterintuitive feature of the decision to abstain that may occur with some 
frequency in our democratic voting procedures.  The next subsection, 
however, shows that one of our fundamental intuitions about abstention—
that it expresses something akin to indifference—is often false.  
B.  When Abstention Fails To Express Indifference 
The No-Show Paradox demonstrates that, in some situations, people 
can make their favored outcome more likely by withholding their votes.  
But there is a second, more powerful feature of abstentions that has 
entirely escaped notice.  In many situations, abstaining is the equivalent to 
                                                                                                                          
79 Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, 
62 VAND. L. REV. 1217, 1235–37 (2009). 
80 See id. at 1235. 
81 See id. at 1236. 
82 See RIKER, supra note 6, at 123–28; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 79, at 1235. 
83 See Feld & Grofman, supra note 76, at 72–73; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 79, at 1236–37; 
Richard G. Niemi, Majority Decision-Making with Partial Unidimensionality, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
488, 488 (1969). 
84 See NORMAN FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY 19–20 
(1978); Hayden & Bodie, supra note 79, at 1237. 
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casting a vote weighted in favor of one of the alternatives.  This insight 
arises out of a fast-developing branch of social choice theory called voting 
power theory. 
1.  Voting Power Theory 
Voting power theory focuses its attention on weighted voting systems 
in which voters are given different amounts of influence on the outcome of 
an election.85  This type of voting system is used everywhere from the 
European Union Council of Ministers to shareholder meetings (where 
votes are weighted by the number of shares) to the U.S. Electoral College.  
Voting power is typically defined as the ability to influence the outcome.86  
The primary insight of voting power theory is that voting power is not the 
same as—or even proportional to—voting weight.87  
Take, for example, a governing body with four members (A, B, C, and 
D) whose respective voting weights are 9, 7, 4, and 1.  If they make 
decisions using majority rule, they need a total of 11 (out of the 21 total) to 
pass any resolution.  How do you analyze the voting power of the four 
members?  Let’s start with our intuitions.  We would suspect that voter A 
(with 9) has more power than B (7), and much more power (more than 
twice the voting weight!) than C (4).  One would also suspect that voter D 
(1) has very little voting power, but that a little power is better than none at 
all.   
Basic voting power theory, however, reveals the flaws in these 
intuitions.  Voters A, B, and C actually have identical voting power, and D 
has none.  There are three minimally sufficient coalitions to reach the 
required threshold of 11: AB (with 16); AC (with 13); and BC (with 11).  
A, B, and C have an equal chance of casting the decisive vote; D’s vote is 
never relevant.  Voting power analysis reveals that this situation is actually 
equivalent to that of a three-member body (A, B, and C) with one equally-
weighted vote apiece and majority rule (which, keeping the votes whole in 
this case, would require 2 out of the 3 votes).  Voting power is not 
necessarily the same as, or proportional to, voting weight. 
                                                                                                                          
85 See FELSENTHAL & MACHOVER, supra note 7, at 3–5.  For a brief history of voting power 
theory, see id. at 6–10.  Voting power theory made its biggest splash in a series of articles in the late 
1960s by John Banzhaf.  See generally John F. Banzhaf III, Multi-Member Electoral Districts—Do 
They Violate the “One Man, One Vote” Principle, 75 YALE L.J. 1309 (1966); John F. Banzhaf III, One 
Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College, 13 VILL. L. REV. 304 (1968); 
John F. Banzhaf III, Weighted Voting Doesn’t Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 
317 (1965).  Courts, by and large, did not follow Banzhaf’s arguments.  See, e.g., Bd. of Estimate v. 
Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 697–99 (1989) (rejecting the application of Banzhaf’s measure of voting power 
in a case involving the New York City Board of Estimate).  For a brief history of the use of voting 
power theory at the state and local level, see Jurij Toplak, Equal Voting Weight of All: Finally “One 
Person, One Vote” from Hawaii to Maine?, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 123, 151–57 (2008). 
86 See FELSENTHAL & MACHOVER, supra note 7, at 36 (referring to the ability to influence the 
outcome as “I-power”). 
87 See id. at 2–3. 
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Although voting power theory typically analyzes voting games where 
the voting weights are expressed as whole numbers, voting power may be 
expressed in other ways.  One may re-describe the voting game above as 
four voters with voting weights that are fractions of the total (9/21, 7/21, 
4/21, and 1/21).  Or, more to the point, in a voting situation where 
members have equally weighted votes, we may talk about fractions of each 
vote.  Because such votes are usually indivisible, a voter typically casts a 
vote with weight of 100% (a yea vote) or 0% (a nay vote).  But one may 
further analyze voter actions, such as abstention, in terms of the voting 
weight.  The assumption that abstaining is a neutral expression of 
indifference, for example, may be restated as the equivalent of casting a 
vote weighted at 50%, a fifty-fifty proposition.  The question, then, is 
whether that accurately captures what goes on with abstention. 
2.  Abstention 
Unfortunately, voting power theory, like other theories of voting, has 
been late to the game when it comes to considering abstentions.  Most of 
the work assumes that voters cast their votes and then analyzes their 
relative voting power.  A few recent pieces have built abstentions into the 
analysis,88 but not in a way that lends much insight to the precise issues 
discussed below.  
The effect of an abstention obviously depends upon the election 
procedures in place.  One procedural feature is particularly important: 
whether the election uses an absolute or relative quota.  A quota is the 
decision threshold for an election.  Elections commonly use quotas such as 
majority rule or supermajority requirements such as two-thirds or three-
fifths approval.  A proposition is passed if the total weight of the vote for it 
is equal to or greater than the quota.  An absolute quota is when a certain 
number of votes in favor of a proposition is required for approval.  A 
relative quota is when a required fraction of votes in favor of a proposition 
is required for approval.  
Take, for example, a legislative body composed of 100 eligible voters.  
If that body makes a decision through a vote requiring an absolute quota of 
3/5, then at least 60 votes must be cast in favor of the proposition in order 
for it to pass.  The number of abstentions, for whatever reason, would have 
no effect on the number of votes required for passage.  It’s always 60.  If, 
on the other hand, that body uses a relative quota of 3/5, then the number 
of votes required for passage may vary with the number of voters casting a 
ballot.  If all 100 members vote, then, as with the absolute quota, the 
measure passes with at least 60 votes.  But if 10 voters abstain on a 
                                                                                                                          
88 See generally id. at 279–93; Braham & Steffen, supra note 7; Lindner, supra note 7; Felsenthal 
& Machover, Models and Reality, supra note 7; Felsenthal & Machover, Ternary Voting Games, supra 
note 7; Freixas & Zwicker, supra note 7. 
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particular vote, then 54 votes in favor (3/5 of the remaining 90 voters) 
would be required for approval.  The basic difference, then, is that an 
absolute quota does not change with respect to the number of voters, but a 
relative quota does.   
There are a fair number of electoral bodies with absolute quota 
requirements.89  They are most often used to ensure adequate support when 
making changes to constitutions, bylaws, and other fundamental 
documents.  Proposed amendments to the U.S. Constitution, for example, 
must be ratified by an absolute quota of three-fourths of the states, now 
thirty-eight,90  and an absolute majority of shareholders must approve of a 
corporate merger.91  But they are sometimes used in other situations.  
Many state legislatures, for example, require absolute majorities to pass 
state laws.92  Absolute quotas act to ensure a certain level of participation 
along with the required support. 
With absolute quotas, an abstention affects the outcome in a relatively 
straightforward way—it functions the same as a “no” vote.93  In our 
hypothetical legislative body of 100 voters, the quota remains at 60 votes 
in favor regardless of how many members cast a ballot—voting “no” and 
abstaining both cut into the number of votes required for passage.  Indeed, 
Robert’s Rules of Order acknowledges this, albeit in a rather confused 
fashion.  The book warns that absolute quotas are “generally undesirable” 
in part because those “who fail to vote through indifference rather than 
through deliberate neutrality may affect the result negatively.”94  The 
confusion arises because indifference should be contrasted with deliberate 
opposition, not neutrality, because the point of the warning is that 
abstention affects the result negatively.  And while the negative effect of 
abstaining with an absolute quota may be obvious to more sophisticated 
voters, this confusion reminds us that it is completely at odds with the 
widespread impression that an abstention signals something akin to 
indifference. 
One thing is clear: for legislative bodies using absolute quotas, 
abstentions count as votes against a proposition.  This is interesting, since 
it doesn’t support the general meme that abstention expresses indifference.  
                                                                                                                          
89 For a general discussion of absolute majority quotas, see Adrian Vermeule, Absolute Majority 
Rules, 37 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 643, 643–47 (2007). 
90 U.S. CONST. art. V (providing that amendments “shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as 
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States or by 
Conventions in three fourths thereof”). 
91 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2010). 
92 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(b); MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 22. 
93 See ROBERT’S RULES, supra note 32, at 390; Sreejith Das, Abstaining (Almost) Never 
Expresses Indifference: A Short Note on Abstention in Weighted Voting Games (2009) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Das, Abstaining]; Sreejith Das, Class Conditional 
Voting Probabilities (unpublished Ph.D thesis, Birkbeck College, University of London, 2008) 
[hereinafter Das, Voting Probabilities].  
94 ROBERT’S RULES, supra note 32, at 390.  
 2010] THE UNEXPECTED POWER OF WITHHOLDING YOUR VOTE 607 
But, in the grand scheme of things, only a few legislative bodies, and 
almost no large public elections, use absolute quotas.  The more interesting 
result appears when the voting procedure makes use of a relative quota. 
For most large public elections and many smaller legislative bodies, 
relative quotas are the procedural norm.  Most public elections are decided 
by either a majority or plurality of the votes cast—a relative quota.  
Legislative votes typically operate the same way.  Both houses of 
Congress, for example, use relative quotas in most of their lawmaking.  
And, as we saw above, smaller parliamentary bodies making use of 
Robert’s Rules of Order have a preference for relative quotas in their 
decision-making.95  
The effect of an abstention on a vote with a relative quota is less 
straightforward than with an absolute quota, but, nonetheless, has not been 
the subject of much scholarly attention.  The relative quota, true to its 
name, changes along with the number of abstentions.  The relative quota in 
our hypothetical legislative body, for example, moved along with the 
number of members who abstain—or, more directly, with the number of 
remaining voters who cast a vote for or against the proposition.  Unlike the 
case of an absolute quota, abstentions are not counted as votes for or 
against a proposition, but instead as a tertium quid, some “third thing.” 96 
That “third thing” is regarded in different ways, but is widely believed 
to have no effect on the outcome.  Some conceive of an abstention as a 
third kind of vote, a way of splitting the difference or spreading voting 
power equally among the alternatives.97  In this view abstaining is like 
casting a ballot that gives half a vote for and half a vote against the 
proposition—the net effect of which is a wash.  This impression is 
consistent with the view that abstention indicates indifference.  Others 
view abstention as a non-vote, as something that just isn’t relevant to the 
decision at all.  This is the view taken by Robert’s Rules of Order, which 
states that an abstention in a situation with a relative quota has “absolutely 
no effect” on the outcome of the vote.98  While this is a slightly different 
formulation, it too is consonant with the prevailing view that abstentions 
are often used to register something akin to indifference.  
With a relative quota, the number of votes required to win varies with 
the number of votes cast; thus, with relative quotas, the effect of a voter’s 
decision to abstain is twofold.  First, it removes the voter’s potential 
                                                                                                                          
95 See id. at 389–91. 
96 See Braham & Steffen, supra note 7, at 334; see also FELSENTHAL & MACHOVER, supra note 7, 
at 279–83.  As we shall see below, this is not quite true in cases where the relative quota is set at one 
hundred percent, or unanimity.  In those cases, an abstention would normally have the same function as 
a “yes” vote. 
97 See, e.g., Freixas & Zwicker, supra note 7, at 401. 
98 See Frequently Asked Questions: Question 6, THE OFFICIAL ROBERT’S RULES OF ORDER WEB 
SITE, http://www.robertsrules.com/faq.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
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support for, or opposition to, the proposition.  Second, and more 
importantly, it reduces the number of votes necessary to pass the 
proposition.  What this second effect means is that the abstainer’s potential 
support or opposition to the proposition is very often not removed in equal 
measure—fifty-fifty, as it were—but instead removed in proportion to the 
quota.  In other words, as Sreejith Das recently proved, abstaining has the 
same effect as casting a vote in favor of the proposition weighted at the 
level of the quota.99  Some examples will make this point clear. 
3.  Examples 
a.  Abstention with a Relative Quota of Unanimity 
This unexpected power of abstention is most disconcerting where the 
quota is highest, and the highest possible quota is a unanimity requirement.  
Take, for example, a body of 10 voters with such a quota.  If all 10 voters 
cast a ballot, then the number of votes required for passage is 10.  But, 
because this is a relative quota, that number changes with abstentions.  If 1 
voter abstains, the number of votes required for passage is 9; if 2 abstain, 
the number is 8; and so on.  So what does this mean about the effect of 
abstaining in this situation? 
Quite simply, it means that an abstention is the equivalent to casting a 
full ballot in favor of the proposition.  One can abstain or one can vote 
100% for the proposition—the effect on the outcome is exactly the same.  
This is a far cry from registering indifference, which would presumably 
apportion one’s voting power equally between the alternatives.  Such an 
apportionment—indeed, any apportionment of the voting power of 
abstaining members against the proposition—would mean that the 
proposal failed.  For even if 9 voted in favor of the proposition, the single 
abstention, treated as a fifty-fifty vote, would mean 9.5 votes in favor, 
short of the original required 10.  Thus, an abstaining member, in effect, 
votes most strongly in favor of a proposition in the very case where the 
voting procedure is designed to make passage the most difficult. 
b.  Abstention with a Relative Quota of Two-Thirds 
A two-thirds majority is required for many important legislative 
decisions.  In the most well-known example, Congress may override a 
presidential veto only upon a two-thirds vote of both the Senate and House 
of Representatives.100  Congress is required to meet the same quota when 
proposing constitutional amendments101 and, in the Senate’s case, ratifying 
treaties102 and convicting a president, vice president, or other civil officer 
                                                                                                                          
99 See Das, Abstaining, supra note 93, at 3–4; Das, Voting Probabilities, supra note 93.  
100 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
101 Id. art. V. 
102 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 2010] THE UNEXPECTED POWER OF WITHHOLDING YOUR VOTE 609 
in an impeachment proceeding.103  Some state legislatures often have 
similar requirements for important decisions.  In all of these situations, the 
electoral bodies wish to make change more difficult, and thus the higher 
decision threshold ensures that something closer to consensus must be in 
place in order to achieve it.  That an abstention in such situations actually 
functions as a vote loaded in favor of change is quite surprising. 
Take a simple example of a body with 9 voters and a 2/3 relative 
quota.  If all members vote, 6 votes are required for approval.  If 3 
members abstain, only 4 votes are required for approval (2/3 of the 
remaining 6 voters).  What this means, though, is that, by abstaining, the 
three non-voting members cast a vote weighted 2/3 in favor of the 
proposition.  Had their abstentions only counted as fifty-fifty for and 
against the proposition, the total voting weights in a close case would only 
add up to 5 1/2 (4 full votes and 3 half votes for the proposition), short of 
the original requirement of 6.  By abstaining, they ended up casting the 
equivalent of a 2/3 vote in favor of the proposition.  Once again, their 
abstentions had the effect of casting a weighted vote in favor of the 
proposition at the level of the quota.   
Something very similar to this recently occurred in the vote for 
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”).  
The IAEA, which reports to the United Nations General Assembly and the 
Security Council, is an independent agency established to promote the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy and discourage its use for military 
purposes.104  The Board of Governors is one of the agency’s two policy-
making bodies; among other things, it elects the IAEA’s Director General 
for a four-year term.105  In 2008, Director General Mohamed ElBaradei 
signaled that he would not seek a fourth term, thus setting up what became 
a most interesting election for the next Director General.106 
The Board of Governors is a 35 member body with a 2/3 relative quota 
for election of Director General.107  In a series of votes, Japan’s Yukira 
Amano received 23 votes to South Africa’s Abdul Samad Minty’s 12 
votes, just short of the quota of 24 (23 1/3 rounded up).108  The logjam was 
broken in the final vote when one of Minty’s supporters abstained, which 
reduced the quota to 23 (22 2/3 rounded up) and produced Amano’s 
victory.109  The abstention had the effect of casting a 2/3 weighted vote in 
                                                                                                                          
103 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
104 See INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, STATUTE OF THE IAEA, arts. I, III(B)(4)–(5) [hereinafter 
IAEA], available at http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
105 Id. arts. V–VI. 
106 See Atomic Agency Leader to Leave Office Next Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2008, at A10. 
107 See IAEA, supra note 104, arts. VI–VII; Sharon Otterman & Alan Cowell, Atomic Agency’s 
New Chief Favors Strict Policy on Iran, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2009, at A12. 
108 See Alan Cowell, Atomic Agency Examines Candidates to Replace ElBaradei, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 27, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/world/27atomic.html. 
109 See Otterman & Cowell, supra note 107. 
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favor of the leader, Amano—and it lowered the barrier enough to produce 
a victory for Amano in the absence of any additional support. 
The IAEA election, however, doesn’t demonstrate the phenomenon in 
question quite as crisply as the example with 9 members, a 2/3 quota, and 3 
abstentions.  Had the abstainer’s vote been distributed fifty-fifty, Amano 
still would have met the quota, since he would have 23 1/2 votes to 
Minty’s 11 1/2, which is above the original quota of 23 1/3.  But it does 
demonstrate how abstentions with a relative quota can lead to unexpected 
results by lowering the number of votes necessary to win.  It also leads us 
to a slight variation on the example that makes the point a bit sharper. 
Imagine, for example that after the series of votes with a 23 to 12 
deadlock, a weary Amano supporter approaches a Minty supporter and 
makes the following pitch: “On the next vote, instead of casting ballots for 
our favored candidates, and canceling each other out once again, let’s both 
abstain in order to protest this ridiculously long election process.”  The 
Minty supporter agrees.  But, to his surprise and dismay, even though none 
of the other members changed their votes, Amano is elected Director 
General.  What happened? 
What happened is that the power of abstention was on full display.  By 
abstaining, the two voters did not merely cancel each other out as they 
would have if abstentions had the effect of casting a fifty-fifty vote.  Split 
fifty-fifty, the effective vote would have been the same 23 to 12 tally, and 
the outcome would not have changed because neither candidate would 
have met the original quota of 23 1/3 votes.  But, because of the 2/3 quota, 
the simultaneous abstentions actually had the effect of casting two votes 
weighted at 2/3 in favor of the leading candidate, Amano, and two votes 
weighted 1/3 in favor of the trailing candidate, Minty.  Amano, therefore, 
effectively ends up with 23 1/3 of the 35 votes, just meeting the original 
quota.  As it played out, the two abstentions meant that Amano captured 22 
of the 33 votes cast, which met (exactly) the relative quota of 2/3.  Whether 
described as a weighted vote or as a reduction in the quota with an uneven 
effect on the candidates, the result is the same.  The abstentions, then, were 
anything but an expression of protest designed to be neutral as between the 
candidates.  Instead, they had the effect of casting weighted votes in favor 
of the leading candidate. 
The Minty supporter would have been well-advised to “pair” his single 
abstention with those of two Amano supporters in order to achieve their 
desired outcome of not affecting the result.  Indeed, this appears to be the 
practice in the U.S. Senate when voting on a matter that requires a two-
thirds majority, such as treaty ratification.  Congressional practice has long 
allowed pairing, a practice in which absent members agree to be recorded 
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on opposite sides of the issue.110  The paired votes are not counted in the 
vote total, but may be reported in the record to assure constituents that the 
absence of their representatives did not affect the outcome of the vote.  On 
a matter requiring a simple majority, votes could be paired off one-to-one 
with no effect on the outcome.111  But where a two-thirds majority is 
required, such a pairing would effectively result in a weighted vote being 
cast in favor of ratification.  For that reason, the Senate appears to “pair” 
off votes in the ratio of two votes in favor to one against, a rare instance of 
the power of abstention being built into practice.112   
Failing to pair off votes two-to-one in a two-thirds quota situation, and 
simply pairing votes one-to-one, would result in casting votes in favor of 
the proposition.  Indeed, Terry Radtke has described how one such 
misguided pairing occurred in the Wisconsin Assembly, and ended up 
being critical in a two-thirds vote to override a gubernatorial veto.113  And, 
of course, the effect of a single, unpaired abstention in this situation is still 
the equivalent of a two-thirds vote in favor of ratification, not an 
expression of indifference.   
c.  Abstention with a Relative Majority Quota 
 With a relative majority quota, the effective weight of an abstention 
comes closer to the fifty-fifty expression of indifference.  This should not 
come as a great surprise given what we now know about the relationship 
between the quota and the effects of abstention.  The precise effective 
weight of an abstention, however, depends upon how the majority quota is 
defined.   
In some cases, a majority quota is defined as 50% of those casting a 
vote plus one vote.  That formulation, which is rightly rejected by many 
democratic institutions,114 produces a relative quota that starts out quite 
high with smaller electorates and approaches (but, importantly, never 
reaches) 50% as the electorate grows larger.  The effective weight of an 
abstention is, again, equal to the quota.  Thus, the weight of an abstention 
goes as follows with the number of voters: 
                                                                                                                          
110 See CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE, 
RESEARCH, AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 543–45 (1989). 
111 See infra Part III.B.3.c. 
112 See, e.g., C.P. Trussell, Senate Approves 4 Peace Treaties, Rejecting Delay, N.Y. TIMES, June 
6, 1947, at 1 (describing how Senators in favor of ratification of a treaty were “paired” against two 
Senators who opposed ratification).  
113 See Terry Radtke, The Last Stage in Reprofessionalizing the Bar: The Wisconsin Bar 
Integration Movement, 1934–1956, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 1001, 1013 (1998).  After pairing off eight sets 
of two votes (which did not count), the Wisconsin Assembly voted 51 to 25 to override the governor’s 
veto with a two-thirds majority.  Had the paired votes counted, the vote would have been 59 to 33, 
short of the required two-thirds majority.  Id. 
114 The “50% + 1” rule produces unanticipated results with an odd number of voters.  For 
example, with 3 voters, the rule produces a quota of 2.5, meaning that a proposal that received 2 out of 
the 3 votes would fall short of the quota and fail to pass. 
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Number of Voters Votes to Pass 
(50% + 1) 
Quota/Abstention 
Weight 
2 2 100% 
3 2.5 83% 
4 3 75% 
5 3.5 70% 
10 6 60% 
15 8.5 57% 
20 11 55% 
25 13.5 54% 
30 16 53% 
50 26 52% 
100 51 51% 
1000 501 50.1% 
10,000 5001 50.01% 
 
Under this definition of a majority quota, then, abstaining is equivalent 
to casting a vote weighted in favor of the proposition.  The exact weight of 
the effective vote varies with the size of the electorate from 100% to 
slightly more than 50%.  But it never quite becomes a fifty-fifty 
proposition. 
Most institutions, though, define their majority quota most simply as 
“more than half.”  When a majority quota is relative, an abstention 
effectively counts as a vote weighted “more than half” in favor of the 
proposition.  But, unlike the “50% + 1” formulation, “more than half” 
approaches the limit of 50% regardless of the size of the electorate.  For 
this reason, the weight of an abstention is effectively at that 50% limit.  Put 
another way, it is impossible to devise an example where counting an 
abstention as a vote weighted “more than half” generates a different 
outcome than counting the abstention as a vote simply weighted as “half.”  
That is, in practice, the effective weight of an abstention is the fifty-fifty 
proposition that most expect it to be. 
d.  Abstention with a Relative Quota of One-Fifth 
While democratic institutions usually keep their decision thresholds 
above 50%, there are some voting procedures that require something less 
than majority support.115  Take, for example, the United States 
                                                                                                                          
115 In some well-known instances, such minority voting thresholds come in the form of an 
absolute quota.  For example, the National Labor Relations Board requires employees who want a 
union election to make a showing of interest equal to thirty percent of the members of the proposed 
bargaining unit. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, PROCEDURES GUIDE, http://www.nlrb.gov/ 
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constitutional requirement that one-fifth of those present may demand a 
roll call vote in either house of Congress.116  If a member of Congress is 
present and abstains on such a demand, then the effect of the abstention is 
to vote wholly against the roll call vote—the abstention functions as it 
would with an absolute quota requirement.  On the other hand, if a member 
abstains by being absent from the chambers, the effect of the abstention is 
like it is in a relative quota situation: it functions as a vote in favor of the 
demand weighted at the level of the quota. 
But where, as here, the quota is less than a majority, a vote in favor of 
the demand at the level of the quota is actually a weighted vote against the 
proposition.  On a demand for a roll call vote, for example, a member of 
Congress who abstains (by being absent) effectively casts a vote 20% in 
favor of having a roll call vote . . . and 80% against.  Staying away from 
the legislative chambers in such a situation may be intended to express 
something like indifference, but, yet again, the actual effect of the 
abstention is to cast a weighted vote, this time strongly against the demand 
for a roll call vote.  And, paradoxically enough, an abstaining member 
effectively votes against a demand for a roll call vote when the one-fifth 
voting threshold is designed to make such a demand relatively easy to 
accomplish.   
4.  Implications 
In many cases, abstentions have a surprising effect upon outcomes.  
The baseline expectation is that an abstention expresses indifference by 
either having no influence on the outcome or by being the equivalent to 
spreading one’s voting power equally among the alternatives.  This, 
however, is often not the case.  In situations with absolute quotas, an 
abstention is equivalent to a full vote against the proposition.  With relative 
quotas, an abstention functions as a weighted vote in favor or against the 
proposition, the precise weight determined by the level of the quota.  With 
a relative majority quota defined simply as “more than half,” this doesn’t 
end up being much of a problem.  But other relative quotas have the 
perverse effect of making an abstention equivalent to casting a vote 
weighted in favor of a proposition where the quota is set to make change 
more difficult (more than half), and of casting a vote weighted against a 
proposition where the quota is set to facilitate passage (less than half). 
The full implications of the perverse effects of abstentions are beyond 
the scope of this Article.  Generally speaking, however, the gap between 
perception and reality regarding the impact of abstention on outcomes may 
be bridged in a couple of different ways—by changing the perception or 
                                                                                                                          
publications/procedures_guide.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).  Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court 
requires four votes for a grant of certiorari.  These absolute quotas are not the subject of this section.   
116 U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 3. 
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changing the reality.  Changing the perception would involve educating 
voters and other decision-makers about the potential effect of withholding 
their votes.  This is not as much of an issue when dealing with absolute 
quotas, because most voters in such situations recognize that withholding 
their vote is the functional equivalent of casting a vote against the 
proposition.  Relative quotas, though, are another story.  While voters 
correctly assume that an abstention in the face of a simple majority quota is 
a fifty-fifty proposition, they are often wildly wrong about the effect of 
withholding their votes at almost every other quota level.  The effect of 
abstaining in such situations is counterintuitive—voting procedures with 
supermajority requirements, designed to resist change, count abstentions as 
weighted votes in favor of change; voting procedures with quotas at less 
than a majority, designed to facilitate passage, count abstentions as 
weighted votes against passage.  While abstentions are thought to express 
indifference, abstaining with a relative supermajority quota may, instead, 
tip the balance in favor of passage, and thus have an effect that is anything 
but indifferent with respect to the outcome.  Those who design decision 
procedures, and the voters who use them, need to be aware of the actual 
impact of withholding votes. 
Changing the reality of how abstentions are counted is also a 
possibility.  The most straightforward way to do so would be to adopt 
procedures that count abstentions as equally splitting the weight of one’s 
potential vote among the alternatives.  This would ensure that a potential 
voter’s indifference—whether honest, feigned in favor of some other 
value, or forced by a conflict of interest—is appropriately weighted in the 
outcome.  This would allow us to avoid the kind of anomalous situations 
that occur, for example, at the intersection of supermajority requirements 
and conflict-of-interest rules.  It makes absolutely no sense for a voter with 
a conflict of interest in a matter that requires supermajority approval to 
effectively cast a weighted vote in favor of his own position.  A simple 
adjustment of the way abstentions are weighted in the outcome would align 
the perceived and actual effect of withholding your vote.   
In any event, adjustments to the perception or reality of abstention 
need to be sensitive to the particular voting situation at hand.  With few 
exceptions, large elections use simple majority quotas, and thus are not 
normally subject to this particular feature of abstention.  Smaller 
democratic institutions, however, are much more likely to use 
supermajority or minority voting requirements.  And these smaller 
institutions may involve voters with a wide range of experience and 
sophistication.  Professional legislators, for example, can usually do a good 
job figuring out the precise effects of their decisions to abstain;117 if 
                                                                                                                          
117 But see supra note 112, and accompanying text.  
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anything, we may worry that any deviation from existing rules would just 
provide additional fodder for strategic manipulation.  The less 
sophisticated voters that populate a wide range of public and private boards 
and committees, however, are much more likely to be caught off guard by 
the effect of an abstention on an outcome.  Thus it is in these situations that 
the role of abstentions in outcomes should be examined most carefully. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Shortly before he died, Jeremy Bentham, one of the principal architects 
of utilitarianism, directed that his body be preserved in order to inspire 
future generations.118  While his “auto icon” is normally kept on public 
display at the University College London, it is occasionally wheeled into 
the meetings of the College Council, where it is listed as “present but not 
voting.”119  The joke trades on the well-settled expectation that abstentions 
have no effect on outcomes.  But we now know that abstentions affect 
democratic outcomes in real and unexpected ways.  Being “present but not 
voting” may very well have the effect of casting a weighted vote in favor 
or against a particular proposal before the council, and Bentham’s 
influence on modern affairs of the University College London may 
unexpectedly extend beyond the persuasive power of his philosophical 
writings. 
                                                                                                                          
118 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 56 (2009). 
119 See id. at 57. 
